Scoring the Long War by Boyden, Andrew et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2008
Scoring the Long War
Boyden, Andrew
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34383
_____________________________________Boyden, Menard, Ramirez: Scoring the Long War 
 
Scoring the Long War 
Andrew Boyden, Phillip Menard, Robert Ramirez 
The score for the Long War can look very different depending on which 
scorecard is used.  Emphasis is currently placed on historically-based, quantifiable, 
state-versus-state measures which attempt to correlate what we are doing with how we 
are doing.  But the current fight against al-Qaeda is not a state-versus-state war and 
requires a different metrics that more accurately depict who is winning and who is 
losing. 
Introduction 
The score for the Long War can look very different depending on which 
scorecard is used.  Each side has its own set of metrics – measures of effectiveness 
(MOE) – for keeping score, metrics that often paint a self-serving picture of the realities 
on the war’s various battlefields.  Even within each side, different groups can, and do, 
have scorecards that look very different from one another.  One needs look no further 
than the United States’ (US) political arena, especially in this past election year, to find a 
broad spectrum of views on the US performance in the war. 
 In media headlines and decision making circles throughout the US government 
and military, great emphasis is placed on quantifiable measures like body counts, troop 
surge numbers, weapons expended, enemy leadership targeted, etc.  US decision 
makers routinely use and advertise these MOE; MOE derived from traditional, state 
versus state, third-generation warfare.i  These measures attempt to correlate what we 
are doing with how we are doing.  But traditional MOE do not address the reality that we 
are not fighting a third-generation war.  The current fight against al-Qaeda is a fourth-
generation warii and requires a different set of MOE that more accurately depict who is 
winning and who is losing. 
 While judging US performance in this fourth-generation war using third-
generation metrics seems to be an obviously inappropriate way to score the Long War, 
we suggest the problem with this approach hides a larger, more troubling issue.  By 
focusing on the wrong US measures of success, we completely miss the point that the 
enemy – al-Qaeda – is busy achieving its goals.  To the degree that al-Qaeda is  
succeeding, the US is losing the Long War. 
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Given the proposed inadequacy of the current MOE, perhaps an enemy-centric 
approach can better illuminate the current battlefield reality.  Proceeding from an 
enemy-centric point of view, judging al-Qaeda success in the Long War may reveal 
some insight on how the US can better prosecute the Long War.  We argue that by 
comparing al-Qaeda’s stated goals to their ability to prosecute these strategies, we can 
quickly determine the state of the Long War. 
In order to determine the state of the Long War, we will first list the al-Qaeda 
goals – their MOE – then explore al-Qaeda’s ability to operate in accordance with these 
stated goals.  In order to yield insight into possible US counter-strategy, a brief case 
study from Iraq will be used to articulate what losing looks like for the enemy, paying 
particular attention to those measures that could potentially put al-Qaeda squarely in the 
‘loss’ column. 
 
Al-Qaida Measures of Effectiveness 
 While the number of al-Qaeda statements and fatwas spans the strategic, 
operational and tactical arenas, we have chosen to focus on five strategic goals 
espoused by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership.  Four of the five goals predate the Long 
War.  All five have been articulated by al Qaida senior leadership.  These strategic 
goals come from the 1996 and 1998 fatwas issued against the US and Israel, as well as 
various press statements issued by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.  In short, 
al-Qaeda demands: 
1. US forces leave the Islamic Holy Land – specifically Saudi Arabia – the “land 
of the Two Holy Places”;iii 
2. US forces no longer present in the Middle East;iv,v 
3. US and Zionist (Israeli) forces cease to interfere in Islamic business;vi 
4. Establishment of an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Shari’a Law.vii  This 
presupposes the overthrow of ‘illegitimate sovereigns’ currently in power in 
the Middle East (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc); 
5. Destruction of the US by attacking economic centers.  ”[B]leeding America to 
the point of bankruptcy”viii and “plundering their [the US] money”ix by 
utilization of the provocation effect to start the Long War and the 
demonstration effect throughout Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF 
and OEF). 
 
How successful is al-Qaeda in its current strategies? 
  As Henry Kissinger ruefully noted regarding US strategic struggles in Vietnam, 
“In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla 
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wins if he does not lose.  The conventional army loses if it does not win.”x  In the case 
of the Long War, al-Qaeda has the luxury of operating as guerrillas.  Thus, while al-
Qaeda may appear to be losing by conventional US MOE, an honest assessment of the 
Long War must keep in mind that in not losing, al-Qaeda can continue to spread its 
virulent version of Islam while the US must win in order to stop this spread.   
As noted earlier, al-Qaeda’s strategic goals can be used as MOE for an enemy-
centric scorecard for the Long War.  Thus, an examination of al-Qaeda’s ability to 
operate according to preferred strategies is warranted.  If the US is truly winning the 
Long War, then al-Qaeda will be unable to further the group’s strategic aims.  If, on the 
other hand, al-Qaeda is able to further their strategic aims, we argue the US is likely not 
following a winning strategy and should alter course in order to maximize success. 
  Perhaps the best indicator of al-Qaeda success is its ability to prosecute the 
strategy of ‘bleeding America dry.’xi  From the start of the Long War in 2001 through 
early FY 2009, the total cost of OIF and OEF (comprised of operations throughout the 
world, including not only Afghanistan, but also the Philippines, Africa, and SE Asia) is 
roughly $864 billion USD.xii  Projected costs, assuming the conflict continues through 
2018, range from over $1 trillion USD to as much as $3 trillion USDxiii when all costs of 
the Long War, including equipment recapitalization and veteran’s benefits.  
  The indirect economic impact of the Long War is more difficult to measure, but 
just as important, including economic friction imposed by more onerous restrictions on 
the transport of people, goods and capital.  The creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security alone has led to an increase in public and private homeland security 
cost increases of approximately $34 billion USD from 2001 through 2005.xiv
One way to put the above statistics in perspective is to examine total cost relative 
to other major conflicts in our history and to compare these costs as both absolute 
values and percentages relative to GDP for the duration of the respective conflicts.  In 
order to limit the scope of this analysis, we compare the most expensive war in US 
history, World War II, with the current conflict.  In absolute terms, World War II cost 
approximately $5 trillion USD, adjusted for inflation.xv  This represents approximately 
38% of GDP for the period 1941-1945.xvi  The corresponding outlays for the Long War 
are approximately 1% of GDP.xvii  When expanded to include all defense spending, this 
figure rises to 4% of GDP through 2005.xviii
Thus, while the economic cost is undoubtedly high, and climbing by $9-12 billion 
USD per month,xix the current conflict is not radically out of line with historical 
comparisons.  However, the al-Qaeda strategy has one important feature that World 
War II lacked: the Long War has no clear end.  Even according to conventional MOE, 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are still contentious with no clear winner and 
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significant al-Qaeda presence in both theaters.  The duration of the conflict is thus 
unknown and using pure cost as a benchmark may only serve to reassure conventional 
thinkers that the current US strategy is neither unusually costly, nor is the cost of the 
war a key feature of al-Qaeda’s most recently adopted line of operation. 
Put another way, with each dollar spent in World War II, some measurable 
progress against the enemy could be charted.  In the current conflict, each dollar spent 
appears to have some impact tactically and operationally with the kill or capture of 
targeted individuals.  At the strategic level, however, that correlation becomes far less 
clear.  The ideological draw of al-Qaeda has not been stemmed; in fact, the Council on 
Foreign Relations asserts the Iraqi component of the Long War has become a powerful 
recruiting tool for al-Qaeda.xx Thus, funding for the Long War may actually be 
counterproductive at the strategic level while seductively providing continued hope at 
the tactical level. 
Turning to another stratagem, al-Qaeda has insisted on the removal of US forces 
from Saudi Arabia and the greater Islamic world.  These are related to the demand that 
the US and Israel must cease interference with the affairs of the Muslim world.  
Interestingly, the US has actually made some significant steps toward al-Qaeda 
accommodation in this demand.  For example, the April 2003 announcement of the 
removal of US military personnel from Saudi Arabia to Qatarxxi essentially removed one 
of the major points of contention for al-Qaeda – a perceived US (infidel) occupation of 
the most holy lands in all of Islam.  Though most major news outlets carried the 
announcement, this message was lost just two weeks later when the bombings of three 
American residential compounds signaled a profound statement by al-Qaeda 
reasserting its demand for all US citizens – military and civilian – leave the entire 
Muslim world.xxii
The withdrawal of forces and subsequent targeting of American citizens reveals 
two critical points.  First, the apparent lack of a strategic communications plan focused 
on shaping perceptions in the Muslim world ceded important ground to al-Qaeda in the 
information war.  This phenomenon can be seen anecdotally in the rate with which the 
US falls behind in the information war with al-Qaeda’s media branch – as-Shahab.  A 
focused effort communicating the US effort to partially accommodate al-Qaeda 
demands – regardless of intent – would reap dividends with the target audience.  The 
lack of communication sensitive to the cultural norms in the Muslim world merely 
reinforced al-Qaeda ideology of the US as ‘crusaders’ with ‘Zionist’ conspirators.   
The second point is the attack, which followed the removal of military forces, 
targeting American citizens and other western civilians.  Al-Qaeda’s choice of targets 
should not be surprising given bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa, which specifically directed 
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targeting civilians and key economic targets to expand the modern jihad.  Al-Qaeda 
sees ‘the enemy’ in very different relief than does the US.  That al-Qaeda targeted 
civilians in response to an apparent military accommodation is indicative of a philosophy 
of jihadi ‘Total War.’ 
Additionally, these points are not separable.  The US response to the May 2003 
bombings was predictable in its lack of strategic coherence.  The reaction of US leaders 
was, essentially, to do more of the same: kill or capture al-Qaeda operatives in an effort 
to bring them to justice.xxiii  Al-Qaeda will continue to conduct these kinds of attacks until 
the support infrastructure that enables them is removed.  Furthermore, until the US 
incorporates weapons in the war of ideas, with resonance in the Muslim world to destroy 
the ideology of al-Qaeda, the support base for al-Qaeda will remain largely intact. 
The final goal of al-Qaeda under consideration is the formation of a new Islamic 


















Figure 1. Insurgencies, Terrorism and the Caliphate.xxv
 
Al-Qaeda’s failure to establish such a form of governance speaks to the group’s inability 
to effectively organize to hold ground and create the bureaucratic institutions required to 
govern the amount of territory envisioned in the caliphate.  This is the most 
‘conventional’ al-Qaeda goal and, as such, puts the group in an environment for which it 
is fundamentally unprepared to operate.  Ironically, this goal of the al-Qaeda 
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subordinate, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), was one significant factor in the US ability to 
effectively target and reduce AQIZ operational capability.  AQIZ’ worst mistake appears 
to have been a dramatic overreach in ambitions which were not well received by the 
Sunni population which for so many months provided critical support to AQIZ.  This 
phenomenon will be analyzed in greater detail in the next section, but we conclude with 
the irony that al-Qaeda’s only real ‘loss’ in this war of ideas came when it tried to 
operate conventionally. 
This is an important lesson in how to effectively engage al-Qaeda.  To the degree 
that each side loses when engaging in strategic asymmetry, the US should rapidly 
analyze and assume a mirror imaging of the current enemy to significantly improve its 
chances of victory in a conflict that for over seven years has been decidedly one-
sided.xxvi
 
What Does Losing Look Like for al-Qaeda? 
Al-Qaeda must be perceived as the inferior option in the eyes of their 
constituency.  In order to discredit the movement strategically, it must be defeated 
tactically until the non-hardcore followers are disillusioned with al-Qaeda’s message.  
This disillusionment has begun in Iraq where the US military has been able to take 
advantage of AQIZ miscalculations of indiscriminate targeting of Shi’a and Sunni 
Muslims.   
Prior to September 2006, however, US military units in Ramadi had: 
...inconsistently and excessively applied force, focused operations on 
killing and capturing insurgents, reduced support to local security forces 
before they were capable of controlling and protecting the population 
independently, attempted to gain intelligence through detain and release 
tactics, and conducted operations from consolidated Forward Operating 
Bases located outside of the city.xxvii
In short, these actions were focused on traditional US MOE, which served to isolate the 
Iraqi population and forced it to reluctantly align with AQIZ.  Emboldened by its 
successes in al-Anbar Province, AQIZ publicly “declared Ramadi the future capital of its 
‘caliphate’ in Iraq.”xxviii  By early 2006, Ramadi was considered by many observers 
effectively under AQIZ control.  The US military was relegated to operating out of  
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in north-central and north-west Ramadi,  “…coalition 
operations in Ramadi had originated from large FOBs on the outskirts of town, with 
most forces conducting ‘drive-by COIN’ (or combat) – they exited the FOB, drove to an 
objective or patrolled, were attacked, exchanged fire, and returned to base.”xxix  This 
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tactic forced the population to choose between overbearing American occupiers or 
extreme Islamic ideologues. 
With a lack of US or Iraqi police presence in Ramadi, AQIZ gained the support of 
the city through intimidation and coercion.  By the end of the summer 2006, US military 
commanders in Ramadi realized the local tribes were isolated, under duress, and being 
manipulated by AQIZ.  The US commanders then sought to remedy the situation. 
In September 2006, a young visionary Sunni Sheik, Sittar Albu-Risha, began the 
al-Anbar Awakening Movement – with the support of other influential Sheiks – in order 
to rid Ramadi of AQIZ influence.xxx  With the help and partnership of the al-Anbar 
Awakening, the US military began implementing urban-centric counter insurgency 
techniques by moving company-sized units outside of the FOBs to engage AQIZ 
strongholds in the city, while also establishing hardened and permanent Combat 
Outposts.  This enabled the Iraqi Police to establish a footprint at the Ramadi 
neighborhood level and drive AQIZ out.  Once areas were secured, the US military 
began implementing discriminate ‘soft hits’ when raiding houses in and around the city.  
This technique enabled the US to be viewed as protectors rather than overbearing 
occupiers.   
The Iraqi Police now conducts all operations in Ramadi with US troops 
supporting.  The fact that, in most cases, the Iraqi Police work in their own 
neighborhoods significantly increases their tactical and operational knowledge of the 
criminal and insurgent elements in those neighborhoods.  Once neighborhoods were 
secured, US troops constructed Civil Military Operations Centers to begin rebuilding the 
neighborhood through local contractors.  In addition, influential Sheiks, vital to al-
Anbar’s security, were given funding through US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
order to rebuild their tribal areas and were made “…conduits for humanitarian aid 
efforts, such as free fuel disbursements.”xxxi  This combination of aid to aligned Sheiks 
greatly strengthened their ‘wasta’ with their constituency. 
Through a series of tactical changes, an aggressive counterinsurgency 
campaign, and partnership with the Awakening Movement, the population turned 
against AQIZ in al-Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq (Baghdad, al-Diyala Province, etc.).  
This hindered al-Qaeda’s ability to influence and control the population, reducing 
recruitment.  Without the protection of the population, AQIZ lost its ability to blend in 
with the locals. 
 “Tactical victory became a strategic turning point when farsighted senior leaders, 
both Iraqi and American, replicated the Ramadi model throughout Anbar province, in 
Baghdad, and other parts of the country, dramatically changing the Iraq security 
situation in the process.”xxxii  Ultimately, the pathway to an al-Qaeda ‘loss’ must go 
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through the discrediting of al-Qaeda ideology and a reduction of the appeal of the 
movement at the local level of non-hard core followers who perceive no alternative. 
 
Conclusion 
While the US has hampered al-Qaeda freedoms in both Iraq and Afghanistan, al-
Qaeda continues to dominate the information war.  Al-Qaeda fights at a time, place and 
method of its choosing.  Often, this occurs in an economic sense or on the Internet.  
The battlefield is rarely kinetic.  As Kissinger noted with the Viet Cong, al-Qaeda doesn’t 
need to win, they just need to avoid losing.  The US must win, yet using conventional 
MOE and strategies will not win a guerrilla war.  It did not work in Viet Nam and it is not 
working in the Long War.   
Of the five MOE analyzed, the US is ‘winning’ only one.  Yet even this MOE is 
not the result of keen US insight, rather it is the result of strategic overreach by al-
Qaeda and its surrogate AQIZ.  The US can do better.  By seeing the conflict through 
the enemy’s perspective, the US must shift its efforts to an integrated, information 
centric approach to discredit the al-Qaeda message, highlight al-Qaeda mistakes and 
erode the base of popular support so critical to al-Qaeda success.  This approach 
worked well in al-Anbar and is an approach which may enable the US to more broadly 
engage and defeat al-Qaeda. 
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